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The Regret Elements Scale: Distinguishing the affective and cognitive
components of regret
Joshua Buchanan∗ Amy Summerville† Jennifer Lehmann† Jochen Reb ‡
Abstract
Regret is one of the most common emotions, but researchers generally measure it in an ad-hoc, unvalidated fashion. Three
studies outline the construction and validation of the Regret Elements Scale (RES), which distinguishes between an affective
component of regret, associated with maladaptive affective outcomes, and a cognitive component of regret, associated with
functional preparatory outcomes. The present research demonstrates the RES’s relationship with distress (Study 1), appraisals
of emotions (Study 2), and existing measures of regret (Study 3). We further demonstrate the RES’s ability to differentiate
regret from other negative emotions (Study 2) and related traits (Study 3). The scale provides both a new theoretical perspective
on regret, and a tool for researchers interested in measuring post-decisional regret.
Keywords: emotion, regret, measurement, decision-making
1 Introduction
Individuals often reflect on past outcomes and wish they
had done something differently. Regret, the negative emo-
tion driven by these self-focused thoughts of “what might
have been” (Gilovich &Medvec, 1995), permeates daily life
(Shimanoff, 1984). Regret shapes multiple aspects of deci-
sion processes, from avoidance of the decision to shifting
responsibility for the decision to reframing decision alter-
natives (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), and it motivates in-
formation search about decision alternatives (Shani & Zee-
lenberg, 2007; Summerville, 2011b) and motivates choice
switching (Marcatto, Cosulich & Ferrante, 2015). This
complex emotion can, however, have seemingly paradoxical
consequences: it can help productively guide thoughts and
behavior (Smallman & Roese, 2009; Zeelenberg & Pieters,
2007), but can also lead to decision avoidance (Zeelenberg
& Pieters, 2007).
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We suggest that these divergent outcomes occur in part
because regret has two distinct components: the affective
experience produced by the negative event and the cogni-
tive understanding of the poor decision (Gilovich & Med-
vec, 1995). Conceptualizing regret as consisting of two dis-
tinct elements offers a more nuanced understanding of the
complexities of this emotion, and provides insight into the
mechanisms underlying the varied antecedents and conse-
quences of regret.
We therefore develop and validate a new measure of post-
decisional regret, the Regret Elements Scale (RES). By un-
derstanding regret as a construct composed of two compo-
nents, researchers can examine the consequences of regret
with more precision. Other measures measure these com-
ponents idiosyncratically and thus may emphasize them dif-
ferently. For example, although the RDS (Marcatto & Fer-
rante, 2008) includes distinct items focused on affect and
on counterfactuals, the scale as a whole is intended to dis-
tinguish between regret and disappointment, and it contains
only two items specific to regret alone, both of which fo-
cus on the cognitive component. (The item measuring af-
fect intensity is conceptualized to apply to both regret and
disappointment.) The PPCR scale (Lee & Cotte, 2009) is
specifically focused on regret, but it is designed to address
consumer regret, and it focuses more on the cognitive ele-
ment of regret than the affective component.
1.1 Two components of regret
The psychological constructionist model of emotion (Bar-
rett, 2006; Russell, 2003; Russell & Barrett, 1999) concep-
tualizes emotions as involving a diffuse state of core affect
characterized by a generalized experience of feeling good
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or bad, coupled with a specific cognitive attribution about
the cause of that affective state.1 Following that framework
of emotion being a combination of affect and cognition, the
emotion of regret can be defined as encompassing both neg-
ative affect and a counterfactual thought (Gilovich & Med-
vec, 1994). These thoughts of “what might have been” com-
pare an actual outcome to a hypothetical outcome (Roese,
1997). Counterfactual thoughts can focus on a situation
that could have been worse (downward counterfactual) or
a situation that could have been better (upward counterfac-
tual). When an upward counterfactual thought focused on
the causal role of the self results in negative affect, regret
arises (Gilovich &Medvec, 1995). For any given experience
of regret, a person therefore must both experience negative
affect while also thinking about how the situation could have
turned out better if person’s had chosen differently.
Although both affect and cognition are critical compo-
nents of regret (Roese et al., 2009; Zeelenberg et al.,1998)
the strength of each component can vary across experiences
of the emotion. Regrets can differ in how “hot”, or af-
fectively laden, they feel (Gilovich, Medvec & Kahneman,
1998). Furthermore, counterfactual thoughts can be more
or less prominent depending on the given situation (Kahne-
man & Miller, 1986). Because actual emotional experience
varies in how closely it corresponds to a fully prototypical
experience (Russell, 2003), the relative salience or centrality
of the affective and cognitive elements in any given actual
experience of regret will vary. That is, some experiences of
regret may have a particularly strong affective impact, and
some may have particularly salient counterfactual thoughts.
The current research thus tests the following primary hy-
pothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Cognitive and affective components
of regret are distinct dimensions.
1.2 Affect and cognition in emotional experi-
ence
The joint role of both affect and cognition in emotional ex-
perience is not unique to regret. Cognitive appraisal the-
ory posits that different emotional experiences are uniquely
characterized by, hence distinguished by, different cog-
nitions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Frijda, 1988; Frijda,
Kuipers & ter Schure, 1989; Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavan-
ski, 1994). Regret and disappointment are associated with
comparisons to how things could have been different, but re-
gret concerns how a different choice could have led to a bet-
ter outcome and disappointment concerns how an external
1Other emotion theorists have offered competing frameworks of emo-
tion that are beyond the scope of this paper to address. The current research
is not intended to test competing models of emotion, so in relying on the
psychological constructionist model, we are concerned only with its utility
in understanding regret and its consequences.
event out of one’s control could have done so (Zeelenberg et
al., 1998). Regret and guilt differ in that guilt is specific to
violation of personal standards, social rules, or moral princi-
ples while regret is more general. One might feel regret but
not guilt in an instance where things could have been better,
but one’s principles weren’t compromised by the failed out-
come. For instance, an individual who neglects to check the
forecast might regret not having brought an umbrella, but
generally wouldn’t feel guilty. In contrast, regret and dis-
appointment differ on the basis of the counterfactual being
made. One might regret forgetting to buy a birthday present
for a friend until it was too late to arrive on time (“if only I
had shopped sooner. . . ”), but feel disappointed that the ship-
ment was delayed so that the present arrived late (“if only
the shipping service was more reliable. . . ”).
Given that distinct emotions are distinguished by distinct
patterns of appraisals, we offer a necessary requirement for
any measure of regret:
Requirement 1 (R1): The measure will be related to
appraisals characteristic of regret and not other emotions.
That is, the measure should be positively correlated with
appraisal ratings that are have established positive associa-
tions with regret, negatively correlated with appraisal rat-
ings that have established negative associations with re-
gret, and uncorrelated with appraisal ratings unrelated to re-
gret. Moreover, the number of these dimensions that regret
matches should be greater than the number of matches to the
appraisals to other emotions.
1.3 Regret in decision process and strategic
behavior
Regret plays a complex and even contradictory role in
decision-making and strategic behavior. At times, regret
seems detrimental to these processes. Excessive concern
with past experiences of regret (Ratner & Herbst, 2005) or
the future possibility of experiencing regret (Reb & Con-
nolly, 2009) can result in sub-optimal decision-making. Fur-
thermore, regret compromises subsequent decision-making
in contexts such as negotiations (Larrick & Boles, 1995),
choice (Marcatto et al., 2015), and receptiveness to feed-
back (Reb & Connolly, 2009). However, regret can also play
a beneficial role in decision-making. Experiences of regret
encourage thoughtful and thorough decision-making as well
as the generation of behavioral intentions about the future
(Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Reb, 2008). People are more likely
to recognize and remedy poor decisions from the past after
experiencing regret (Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg, Inman
& Pieters, 2001). Indeed, the continued experience of re-
gret depends on the opportunity for future related decisions
(Summerville, 2011a).
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We suggest that understanding regret as an emotion that
encompasses both affective and cognitive components of-
fers new clarity about the role of regret in decision-making.
The ability to reliably measure these components separately
would thus offer a new tool to researchers interested in post-
decision processes and outcomes.
1.4 The link between components and conse-
quences of regret
Regret can lead to a variety of negative outcomes both
within and beyond decision-making. Most proximally, in-
creased regret is associated with negative mental health out-
comes including greater anxious arousal, depression, and
general distress (Roese et al., 2009). As a more distal out-
come, concern about feeling regret in the future can encour-
age sub-optimal choice strategies and reduce the desire to
receive possibly helpful feedback (Reb & Connolly, 2009),
and can also lead to less successful negotiations between
parties (Larrick & Boles, 1995). More broadly, focusing on
the negative affective reaction to a poor decision encourages
people to switch away from previously effective decision-
making strategies (Ratner & Herbst, 2005). Regret has also
been linked to lower levels of well-being (Torges, Stewart
& Nolen-Hoeksems, 2008), life satisfaction (Lecci, Okun &
Karoly, 1994), and reduced quality of life (Wrosch, Bauer
& Scheier, 2005). Because it appears that many of these
negative consequences relate to emotional reactions to deci-
sions and concern affective states such as anxiety, sadness,
or stress, we posit the following secondary hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2A (H2A): The affective element of regret is
positively associated with emotional distress.
Research has also demonstrated that regret can lead to
positive outcomes. Regret encourages corrective action
(Zeelenberg, 1999) such as generating intentions for fu-
ture behaviors (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000) or switching ser-
vice providers after a bad experience (Zeelenberg & Pieters,
1999; Zeelenberg, Inman & Pieters, 2001). Regret persists
when there is opportunity in the future to attain relevant
goals (Roese & Summerville, 2005; Summerville, 2011a).
Furthermore, anticipated regret can encourage careful and
thorough decision-making (Reb, 2008). The positive conse-
quences of regret thus appear to center on cognitions about
decision-making and the ability to use these inferences to
improve future decisions about ongoing goals. This leads to
the following secondary hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2B (H2B): The cognitive element of regret is
positively associated with related task performance.
1.5 Overview of the present studies
Across three studies, the current research outlines a concep-
tualization of regret as consisting of two separable affec-
tive and cognitive elements, develops a measure of post-
decisional regret, the Regret Elements Scale (RES), and
tests the above hypotheses. Study 1 outlines the creation of
a scale consisting of two 5-item subscales and examines the
convergent relationships of the subscales (Hypothesis 1); it
also examines the predictive validity of the emotion com-
ponent in predicting emotional distress (Hypothesis 2A).
Study 2 tests the validity of the scale as a measure of regret
within the context of cognitive appraisal theory, examining
how the RES converges with established characteristics of
regret, thus examining whether the scale satisfies Require-
ment 1 (i.e., any regret scale should be consistent with the
typical appraisal pattern of regret). Finally, Study 3 exam-
ines its relationships to conceptually similar and dissimilar
constructs, thus providing evidence of both convergent and
divergent validity.
2 Study 1
We initially examined how people understand and character-
ize experiences of regret by asking people to respond to 50
items assessing post-decisional regret after thinking about a
regrettable situation from their past (see Preliminary Study
in Supplemental Materials). This allowed us to create a 10-
item scale containing 5 items measuring the affective ele-
ment and 5 items measuring the cognitive element. The pri-
mary goal of Study 1 was to assess the fit of the hypoth-
esized two-factor structure of the final version of the scale,
and thus provide a replication of the test of Hypothesis 1 that
cognitive and affective components of regret will emerge as
distinct dimensions. We utilized structural equation model-
ing (SEM) to test the fit of the reduced 10-item scale pre-
dicting two elements of regret against two alternative mod-
els: the original 16-item model predicting the two elements
of regret, and a model with the 10 items predicting a single
construct of regret.
Additionally, we assessed the predictive relationship of
the affective subscale to an established measure of emo-
tional distress (Hypothesis 2A). Specifically, we examined
whether the affective subscale would predict scores on the
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Wat-
son & Clark, 1991). The MASQ is a widely used scale to
measure state mood and anxiety (e.g., “I feel tense or high
strung” or “I feel uneasy”). Because previous research has
raised concerns about the anxious arousal and anhedonic de-
pression subscales of the MASQ (Buckby, Yung, Cosgrave
& Killackey, 2007), we examined relationships only with
the general distress subscale. If a connection exists between
the general distress subscale of the MASQ and the affec-
tive but not cognitive element of the RES, it would provide
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evidence supporting our claim that the affective element is
uniquely related to emotional outcomes, and more gener-
ally support the distinctiveness of these two components of
regret. However, given the non-orthogonality of the sub-
scales, we did not predict that the correlations between each
subscale and general distress would necessarily differ from
one another significantly. Furthermore, because the MASQ
is a trait-level measure, we expected only modest correla-
tions with the state-level RES, which measures only regret
about a single, narrowly circumscribed incident.
2.1 Method
One hundred eighty introductory psychology students (125
female) at a university in the Midwestern United States par-
ticipated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. This
sample size is consistent with recommendations for a sam-
ple size of at least 10 times the number of free model pa-
rameters (Hu, Bentler & Kano, 1992). Each participant
completed the tasks on a personal computer in an individ-
ual cubicle. Participants were given a prompt to write about
a regrettable situation (Roese & Summerville, 2005; see Ap-
pendix). Participants then rated each of 16 items (9 affective
and 7 cognitive) in relation to the regrettable situation they
had just described on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly
Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). After rating the scale items,
participants completed the general distress subscale from
the MASQ (Watson & Clark, 1991), along with other un-
related items relevant to the fourth author’s undergraduate
honors thesis.
2.2 Results
We first reduced the 16-item set to a 10-item scale (Table
1) composed of two 5-item subscales (see the Supplemental
Materials for details on this reduction process).
2.2.1 Model comparison
We next used structural equation modeling to assess the fit of
the reduced 10-item model (Figure 1). Because most exist-
ing measures treat regret as a single construct, we wanted to
ask whether our two-factor conceptualization of regret was a
better fit to the data than a single-factor model. We predicted
that the 10-item, two factor model would have the best fit to
the data, supporting the utility of the reduced 10-item scale
and the conceptual soundness of the two-subscale structure.
To analyze the hypothesized models we used Mplus
v.5.21 statistical software (Muthén & Muthén, 2009). Max-
imum likelihood (ML) was used for all parameter estima-
tion. The goodness of fit for each model was tested using
multiple indices: chi-square statistic, Comparative Fit Index
(CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA),
and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). For
Table 1: Regret Elements Scale (RES) Items.
Item
I am experiencing self-blame about the way I made my
decision (A1)
I feel sorry (A2)
I am experiencing self-blame (A3)
I feel guilty (A4)
I feel like kicking myself (A5)
Things would have gone better if I had chosen another
option (C1)
I wish I had made a different decision (C2)
I should have decided differently (C3)
I would have been better off had I decided differently (C4)
Before I should have chosen differently (C5)
Figure 1: Two factors and 10 items. The affective element
and cognitive element are the two factors (latent variables),
predicted by the reduced 10-item set. The factors’ intercor-
relation is shown in between the two factors. ∗ p < .01.
the chi-square statistic, we considered a value within plus or
minus two degrees of freedom and a non-significant statistic
at the p = .05 level indicative of good fit. For the other fit
indices, values equal to or greater than .97 for the CFI and
values equal to or less than .06 for the RMSEA and SRMR
were considered indicative of good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999;
Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger & Müller, 2003).
We first examined the fit of the model in which the re-
duced 10-item scale measured two correlated latent con-
structs (Figure 1). Overall, goodness of fit indices suggested
acceptable to good fit for three of the four indices: χ2 (34) =
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89.30, p < .05; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.10; SRMR = 0.03.
Finally, we examined the single-factor model. Goodness of
fit indices suggested a poor fit for the single-factor model
for all but one of the indices: χ2(35) = 334.58, p < .05;
CFI = 0.79; RMSEA = 0.22; SRMR = 0.09. Chi-square dif-
ferences between models further indicated that the 10-item
model fit significantly better than the single-factor model,
χ
2 (1) = 245.28, p < .001. Our hypothesized model for the
two 5-item subscales of the RES thus offers superior fit rel-
ative to alternative models.
Additionally, we examined whether the scale showed
measurement invariance across gender to ensure that the
scale could be used to make comparisons between gen-
ders. We first fit a model separately estimating the pa-
rameters within each gender, and then compared this unre-
stricted model to a restricted model in which both genders
were constrained to have identical factor loadings and inter-
cepts. This comparison revealed a non-significant difference
in the chi-square statistic, ∆χ2(10) = 5.54, p = .85, indicat-
ing measurement invariance across gender.
2.2.2 Predictive validity
We related each subscale to ratings on the general distress
subscale of the MASQ. As predicted by Hypothesis 2A, the
affective subscale had a significant positive relationship with
the general distress subscale of the MASQ, r = .17, p = .02.
Conversely, and as expected, the cognitive subscale was un-
related to feelings of general distress (r = .07, p = .32); these
correlations were almost significantly different by a test to
compare dependent correlations (p = .051, one tailed, given
the correlation of .67 between the affective and cognitive
subscales).
We also created single-item measures of each element
of regret and assessed their relationship to the general dis-
tress subscale of the These items were selected based on
the strength of their factor loading onto each latent variable.
Although the single affective item (A3: “I am experiencing
self-blame”), unlike the subscale, was only weakly related
to general distress (r = .14), the single cognitive item (C3:
“I should have decided differently”), similar to the subscale,
was unrelated to general distress (r = .03).
2.3 Discussion
Study 1 utilized structural equation modeling to reduce the
scale from 16 to 10 items, with five items assessing the af-
fective element of regret and five items assessing the cog-
nitive element of regret. We then compared the fit of this
hypothesized model to an alternative model in which the
larger set of items was retained and a model in which all
ten items predicted a single latent construct. Whereas both
the 16-item model and the single construct model did not
fit the data well, the hypothesized model had a significantly
better and generally good fit to the data, consistent with Hy-
pothesis 1. We therefore retained the hypothesized 10-item
scale as the final form of the RES.
Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 2A, we examined the re-
lationship of each of the five-item subscales to an estab-
lished measure of emotional distress. As expected, the af-
fective subscale was predictive of general distress whereas
the cognitive subscale was unrelated. These findings pro-
vide initial evidence of the RES’s ability to distinguish be-
tween the affective and cognitive components of regret as
well as their differential consequences.
3 Study 2
Although the original 16 items of the RES were designed
to assess regret, items such as “I feel ashamed” or “I
feel guilty” suggest that the scale could also be measur-
ing shame, guilt, or a non-specific negative affective reac-
tion. Indeed, the initial pool of items assessed both re-
gret and disappointment given the possibility that partici-
pants might not make nuanced distinctions in the language
they use to describe a regrettable experience. Because dif-
ferent emotional experiences can have different influences
on decision-making (Zeelenberg et al., 1998; Zeelenberg &
Pieters, 1999), it is important to ensure that the RES specif-
ically assesses feelings of regret. For that reason, Study 2
examined whether the 10-item RES is consistent with estab-
lished appraisal patterns for regret and not for other negative
emotions (Requirement 1). In so doing, Study 2 provides ev-
idence on convergent and discriminant validity of the RES.
Appraisals represent a cognitive understanding of a situa-
tion, and reliably differ between specific emotions (Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985; Frijda, 1988; Frijda, Kuipers & ter Schure,
1989). Two similar emotions can be distinguished by ex-
amining these appraisals. For instance, sadness and sorrow
are similar emotions but differ in whether or not the self is
seen as a causal agent (Frijda, Kuipers & ter Schure, 1989).
In particular, we focused on nine specific appraisals identi-
fied by Tong (2010): appraising the situation as pleasant, as
being controlled by the individual or the circumstances, as
predictable, that obstacles were faced during the situation,
as fair, as the individual or others being responsible for the
situation, and that the individual exerted effort during the
situation. Past work has demonstrated that regret is char-
acterized by appraising the situation as unpleasant, feeling
responsible for the negative outcome, feeling that the situ-
ation was controllable (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002), and
believing that one exerted effort in the situation (Frijda et
al., 1989). We expected the RES to follow this pattern of
correlations.
Additionally, we expected that to the extent that individu-
als believed their own decisions were central to the outcome,
as expressed through the cognitive component of regret, they
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Table 2: Study 2: Cognitive appraisals characteristic of negative emotions. Columns refer to the nine appraisal dimensions.
Cells containing “+” indicate that a positive relationship between the emotion in the left-most column and that appraisal was
found by Tong (2010), Frijda et al. (1989), and/or van Dijk & Zeelenberg (2002); “-” connotes that a negative relationship
was found by those authors; empty cells signify no relationship was obtained by those authors. The bottom two rows present
zero-order correlations of the nine appraisal dimensions with the RES subscales in Study 2. * p < .01.
Predicted Relationships
Pleasant Controlled Controlled by Predictable Obstacles Fairness Self Others Effortful
by self circumstances encountered responsible responsible
Anger - + - + +
Sadness - - + + - +
Fear - - + - + - +
Guilt - + - + -
Regret - + + +
Obtained Correlations
Affective –.44∗ .21 –.08 –.01 .19 .19 .45∗ –.01 .34∗
Cognitive –.44∗ .36∗ –.14 .06 .09 .36∗ .49∗ .02 .45∗
should see the self as more highly causal and others as less
so. This also means that they would be less likely to see the
situation as having been unfairly controlled by an outside
agent. Due to the focus on the decision-making process, we
thus believed that appraising the situation as controlled by
self and fair would be correlated with the cognitive subscale
but might be unrelated to the affective subscale.
Further, Study 2 distinguished the RES from other neg-
ative decision-based emotions, specifically anger, sadness,
fear, and guilt. Tong (2010) identified characteristic ap-
praisal dimensions for these negative emotions (see top por-
tion of Table 2 for a schematic of these appraisals for each
emotion). We expected that the RES would show a stronger
relationship to dimensions associated with regret (van Dijk
& Zeelenberg, 2002) than to dimensions associated with
negative emotions other than regret, indicating the discrimi-
nant validity of the measure.
3.1 Method
Sixty-three introductory psychology students at a univer-
sity in the Midwestern United States participated in partial
fulfillment of a course requirement. Each participant com-
pleted the tasks on a personal computer in an individual cu-
bicle. Participants first wrote about “a past situation where
a decision you made turned out badly. Think about a time
when a choice you made resulted in negative consequences
for you and/or someone else.”
Participants then rated this situation using 7-point scales
with anchors “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.”
Items within each of the two rating blocks were randomized.
In the first block, participants completed the RES (Affective
subscale (RES-A): α = .87; Cognitive subscale (RES-C): α
= .89). In the second block, participants rated 9 appraisal
dimensions from Tong (2010): how pleasant the situation
was, how responsible they or others were for the situation,
how much the situation was controlled by themselves or the
circumstances, how predictable and fair the situation was,
and whether or not they exerted effort or faced obstacles
3.2 Results
We first examined the relationships between the RES and
the appraisal dimensions (Table 2). As predicted, both com-
ponents had positive relationships with feeling responsible
for the negative outcome, exerting effort during the situa-
tion, and appraising the situation as unpleasant. Addition-
ally, as predicted, the cognitive element was positively re-
lated to appraising the situation as controlled by the self.
The affective subscale was not related to this appraisal, and
the difference between the two correlations was significant
(p = .044, one tailed). The cognitive element of regret was
also significantly related to appraising the situation as fair.
The affective element was not significantly related to this
appraisal, and these correlations were also significantly dif-
ferent from each other (p = .041, one tailed). No other
appraisal dimensions had significant relationships with the
affective subscale or the cognitive subscale (all r < .20, p >
.10).
We next compared previously established appraisal pat-
terns of other negative emotions to the appraisal pattern as-
sociated with the RES. In order to assess which emotion was
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best represented by the RES, we compared correlations be-
tween the RES and each appraisal dimension to both the pat-
tern of appraisals for negative emotions established by Tong
(2010), and the pattern of appraisals established for experi-
ences of regret by Frijda and colleagues (1989) and van Dijk
and Zeelenberg (2002). For the RES to be best representa-
tive of an emotion, it should satisfy three criteria. First, the
RES should correlate positively with an appraisal dimen-
sion when the specific emotion has an established positive
relationship with the appraisal dimension. Second, the RES
should correlate negatively with a dimension when the spe-
cific emotion has an established negative relationship with
the dimension. Finally, the RES should not correlate with
a dimension when the specific emotion has no established
relationship with the dimension. Each of these outcomes
thus represents a “match” to the pattern of correlations ex-
pected for a given emotion. We tested these predictions by
assuming an equal probability of a positive, null, or negative
relationship (in terms of statistical significance) and testing
the binomial probability of the number of matches when the
probability of a success was 33%.
As demonstrated in Table 2, the pattern of appraisals ex-
hibited by the RES did not match the pattern of appraisals
that Tong (2010) suggest represent anger, sadness, fear, or
guilt. Specifically, the RES-A matched only 55% of anger
appraisals, 33% of fear appraisals, and 55% of guilt ap-
praisals. The RES-C matched only 44% of anger appraisals,
44% of sadness appraisals, 33% of fear appraisals, and 44%
of guilt appraisals. However, the pattern of appraisals exhib-
ited by the RES-C matched 89% of the appraisals that Frijda
and colleagues (1989) and van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002)
suggest represent regret, and the RES-A matched 78% of
regret appraisals.
Critically, given the emphasis on the causal role of the
self in the definition of regret (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995),
both subscales had a positive relationship with the appraisal
of how much the individual was responsible for the situa-
tion, and of how much the individual was in control of the
situation for the cognitive subscale only. This pattern of ap-
praisals was not characteristic of any of the other emotions,
indicating the discriminant validity of the RES.
Additionally, the single-item measures of the elements of
regret behaved in a similar manner as their equivalent 5-item
subscale. That is, the affective item was correlated with
feeling responsible for the negative outcome (r = .49, p <
.001), exerting effort during the situation (r = .38, p < .01),
and appraising the situation as unpleasant (r = .37, p < .01),
However, this single-item measure was also correlated with
appraising the situation as being controlled by the self (r =
.26, p = .04), unlike the 5-item subscale. The cognitive item
mirrored the 5-item subscale exactly. It was correlated with
feeling responsible for the negative outcome (r = .44, p <
.001), exerting effort during the situation (r = .32, p = .01),
appraising the situation as unpleasant (r = .45, p < .001),
appraising the situation as being controlled by the self (r =
.34, p < .01), and appraising the situation as fair (r = .33, p
< .01).
3.3 Discussion
Study 2 examined the convergence of the RES with estab-
lished characteristics of regret. In line with past research,
both subscales had a significant relationship with appraisal
dimensions related to regret (Frijda et al., 1989; van Dijk &
Zeelenberg, 2002). Additionally, the pattern of appraisals
associated with each subscale differed from the pattern of
appraisals associated with other negative emotions (Tong,
2010). These combined findings suggest that the RES mea-
sures regret and not emotions such as anger, fear, shame and
guilt, nor a more global negative reaction to adverse out-
comes of decisions. Thus, Study 2 provides support for the
convergent and discriminant validity of the RES, and estab-
lishes that it meets R1 that the measure will correspond to
the pattern of appraisals characteristic of regret and not other
emotions.
Examining the two subscales separately offered new in-
sight into the nature of regret. The cognitive component,
but not the affective component, was related to appraising
the situation as fair and as being under one’s control. These
appraisals can be considered an adaptive response to regret.
Interpreting a prior decision as fair and under one’s con-
trol indicates acknowledgement of the opportunity to make
the correct decision, but not taking it. This understanding
thus allows the individual to learn from past mistakes and
make better decisions in the future (Zeelenberg, 1999). In
contrast, the affective component was unrelated to these ap-
praisals. This component alone may result in individuals be-
ing less likely to draw causal inferences or learn from past
failures, contributing to its negative consequences.
4 Study 3
Although Study 2 demonstrated that the RES measures the
emotion of regret, it is unclear how this scale compares to
existing measures of regret. Study 3 therefore examined
how the RES related to two existing measures of regret:
the state-level Regret and Disappointment Scale (RDS;Mar-
catto & Ferrante, 2008) and a trait-level measure of Regret
Proneness (RP; Schwartz et al., 2002). We predicted that the
RES would be positively related to the Regret Index of the
RDS and unrelated to the Disappointment Index of the RDS.
We also anticipated that the RES would be only modestly re-
lated to trait-level RP (Schwartz et al., 2002) as the RES is a
state-level measure of regret that largely emphasizes the fre-
quency with which an individual feels regret. We anticipate
that even people who feel regret infrequently may be able to
recall a single instance in which they felt relatively strong
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regret, and that regret proneness thus would not necessarily
predict the amount of regret in a single instance.
Additionally, we examined how the RES related to several
other constructs in the emotion and decision-making con-
struct space, including need for cognition, faith in intuition,
and neuroticism. We predicted that the RES would be un-
related to these constructs as they are conceptually distinct
from the experience of regret.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Eighty-four participants were recruited online via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk worker pool (http://www.mturk.com) and
paid for their participation. Because of institutional regu-
lations, participation was limited to US workers only. Six
participants who did not correctly follow instructions were
removed from all analyses, leaving a final sample of 82.
4.1.2 Measures
All measures used a 7-point (1–7) scale ranging from
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.
Regret measures. Participants completed the Regret and
Disappointment Scale (RDS) (7 items; Marcatto & Ferrante,
2008). An example item is, “I wish I had made a different
choice.” Participants also completed the trait-level measure
of regret proneness (5 items; α = .73; Schwartz et al., 2002).
An example item is, “Whenever I make a choice, I’m curi-
ous about what would have happened if I had chosen differ-
ently.”
Discriminant constructs. To establish the discriminant
validity of the RES-C from other cognition-related con-
structs, participants completed the Need for Cognition Scale
(5 items; α = .89; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; example item:
“I prefer complex to simple problems”). To distinguish the
RES-A from other constructs relating emotional experience
to decision-making, participants completed the Faith in In-
tuition Scale (5 items; α = .94; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj
& Heier, 1996; example item: “I believe in trusting my
hunches”). To establish that RES-A was distinct from gen-
eral negative emotionality, participants completed the Neu-
roticism subscale from the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (13
items; α = .85; Costa & McCrae, 1992; example item: “In
general, I am anxious”).
4.1.3 Procedure
Participants were given a prompt to think and write about
a negative decision from their past similar to that used in
Study 2. After spending at least one minute thinking and
writing about the situation, participants completed the RES
(Affective subscale: α = .84; Cognitive subscale: α = .94),
Table 3: Study 3: Correlations between Regret Elements





Regret index .63∗ .79∗
Disappointment index .13 .01
Trait-Level regret .08 .12
Need for Cognition −.11 −.12
Faith in Intuition .11 .10
Neuroticism .12 −.02
Note: Zero-order correlations between the questionnaires
measured in Study 3 and the RES. ∗ p < .01.
followed by the RDS, and then regret proneness. The or-
der of items within each scale was randomized. Participants
then completed measures of need for cognition, faith in intu-
ition, and neuroticism, presented in random order, with the
order of items within scale randomized. Participants were
debriefed and thanked for their time.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Regret measures
We first examined how the RES related to the existing mea-
sures of regret (see Table 3). As predicted, both subscales
had a positive relationship with the Regret Index from the
RDS (rs > 0.63, ps < .001) and were unrelated to the Disap-
pointment Index (rs < 0.13, ps > .26). The state-level RES
was unrelated to trait-level regret proneness, rs < 0.12, ps >
.29.
4.2.2 Discriminant constructs
We next examined the relationships between the RES and
the other constructs. As was expected, both subscales were
unrelated to need for cognition (rs < 0.13, ps > .25), faith in
intuition (rs < 0.12, ps > .29), and neuroticism (rs < 0.12, ps
> .30).
4.2.3 Single-item measures
Once again, the single-item measures of each element had
the same relationships with the other constructs as the 5-
item subscales. The affective item was significantly cor-
related with the Regret Index from the RDS (r = .63, p <
.001), but none of the other constructs (rs < .16, ps > .16).
Similarly, the cognitive item was significantly related to the
Regret Index from the RDS (r = .69, p < .001), but not the
other constructs (rs < .16, ps > .14).
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4.3 Discussion
Study 3 highlights the nuanced understanding of regret pro-
vided by the RES. The state-level RES was related to an-
other state-level measure of post-decisional regret (Marcatto
& Ferrante, 2008) but unrelated to a trait-level measure of
Regret Proneness (Schwartz et al., 2002). This lack of cor-
relation may stem from the fact that we measured a single
situation for each participant. If instead we had participants
complete the RES as a daily diary or experience sampling
procedure, we believe it is more likely that those scores
would be related to regret proneness (i.e., that across all
daily situations, regret prone people feel more regret). Fur-
thermore, demonstrating discriminant validity for the scale,
the RES was unrelated to the constructs of disappointment,
need for cognition, faith in intuition, and neuroticism.
5 General discussion
In three studies, we provided evidence in support of the
two-component conceptualization of regret, and developed
and validated the Regret Elements Scale (RES). We specif-
ically tested and confirmed three hypotheses. Supporting
Hypothesis 1, through the use of confirmatory factor anal-
ysis (Study 1), we established the affective and cognitive
elements as two related but distinct components of regret.
In Study 2, we demonstrated the construct validity of the
scale, as both of the elements of regret were consistent with
appraisals characteristic of regret (Frijda et al., 1989; van
Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002), but not other negative emotions
(Tong, 2010). In Study 3, the scale converged with another
state-level measure of regret (Marcatto & Ferrante, 2008),
but was unrelated to measures of regret proneness, disap-
pointment, neuroticism, need for cognition, and faith in in-
tuition. Furthermore, the two elements of the RES predicted
different consequences of regret. As predicted by Hypothe-
sis 2A, affective but not cognitive regret was related to neg-
ative mental health symptoms in Study 1. We also found
support for Hypothesis 2B: in Study 2, the cognitive com-
ponent predicted more functional aspects of regret, whereas
the emotional component was unrelated to these functional
aspects. The RES thus offers a new, validated, and reliable
measure of post-decisional regret. In addition, the length of
the scale allows for ease of use while still offering reliabil-
ity and validity. Thus, the RES presents researchers with
an alternative to the current practice of assessing state-level
regret with ad hoc measures.
By distinguishing between the affective and cognitive
components of regret, the RES offers researchers an oppor-
tunity to examine the underlying processes involved in the
experience of regret. The distinction between the affective
and cognitive elements clarifies the experience of regret, or
how an individual is experiencing regret. This more nuanced
perspective of regret allows researchers to better understand
the broad range of responses to regret by distinguishing re-
gret that may lead to affective distress from an experience
of regret that fuels preparations for the future. In demon-
strating that each subscale assesses different components of
regret, we have not only provided researchers with a tool to
better understand the experience of regret, but also have of-
fered a perspective on the complexities of the emotion itself.
5.1 Usage of the RES
Although the two subscales of the RES were correlated in
each of the studies reported here, the pattern of results for
the aggregate scale were inconsistent and illustrate the im-
portance of using the two subscales as distinct predictors.
At times, it may not be problematic to aggregate the sub-
scales: in Study 3, the RES-A, RES-C, and aggregate mea-
sure all had the same pattern of relationships to the crite-
rion variables. However, at times using the overall RES
would have masked distinct patterns of relationships for the
RES-A versus RES-C. In Study 2, the total RES was re-
lated to appraisals of the situation as controlled by the self
and as fair. However, the relationship between the aggregate
RES and these appraisals were driven solely by the cogni-
tive subscale; the affective subscale was unrelated to these
appraisals. The aggregate RES would have thus missed the
absent relationship between the RES-A and these appraisals.
Overall, use of the subscales or the aggregate scale should
be determined by theoretical factors. In most cases use of
the subscales will probably more suitable; however, when
researchers are explicitly interested in the combined, or to-
tal, effect of both cognitive and affective components, use of
the aggregate scale may be more appropriate.
We also examined single-item versions of each subscales
for situations when there are barriers to usage of a longer
scale. Although the single item measures generally per-
formed well, there are a number of caveats we would high-
light in their use. In addition to the general concerns about
single-item measurement (e.g., Gardner, Cummings, Dun-
ham & Pierce, 1998; Nunnally, 1978; Oshagbemi, 1999),
we would note that the single-item version of the affective
subscale did correlate with an appraisal dimension to which
the subscale as a whole was unrelated. Furthermore, the af-
fective item focuses on self-blame. Although this is a central
component of regret’s emphasis on self-focused thoughts,
researchers may have concerns about the face validity of the
measure.
5.2 Future directions and limitations
The RES allows researchers to distinguish between two
components of regret, which may lead to a better under-
standing of both the antecedents and consequences of expe-
riences of regret. Although each subscale was able to differ-
entially predict distinct consequences of regret, the two sub-
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scales were highly correlated with each other. Because the
definition of regret contains both cognitive and emotional
aspects (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995), it is likely that both the
cognitive and affective components will be experienced con-
jointly. The fact that the scales allow separate measurement
does not mean that the factors are fully orthogonal. Pre-
cisely how the two elements interact to produce outcomes
should be examined in future research.
The RES could also help advance our understanding
of individuals’ regret regulation strategies, something the
present studies did not focus on. Zeelenberg and Pieters
(2007) distinguish between different methods of reducing
the experience of regret, identifying feeling-, decision-, and
alternative-focused strategies. Future research should ex-
amine whether the feeling-focused strategies may be best
used to reduce the affective component of regret while the
decision- and alternative-focused strategies may more effec-
tively reduce the cognitive component.
Another direction for future work would be to adapt the
RES to measure anticipated rather than experienced regret.
Given that consumers frequently utilize anticipated regret
when making purchasing decisions (McConnell et al., 2000;
Zeelenberg, 1999), and often respond in problematic ways
(e.g., delaying or avoiding a decision), this use of the RES
might also help researchers and practitioners adapt the deci-
sion architecture to minimize maladaptive impacts of antic-
ipated regret.
The present research established predictive validity of the
RES-A only on a general measure of emotional distress,
not a context-specific outcome. We also did not investigate
many aspects of decision-making relevant to the RES-C.
Furthermore, the current studies examined a single instance
of recalled regret for each participant in each study. Future
work is needed to test regret in vivo and to utilize within-
participant measurement to reduce potential error variance.
Whereas we established the measurement invariance of
the RES across genders, the current research did not assess
cross-cultural invariance or validity. Although Study 3 used
a more diverse (i.e., non-undergraduate) sample, it is worth
noting that all samples were limited to the United States.
Cross-cultural validity of a scale cannot simply be assumed.
For example, research has shown cross-cultural differences
in emotionality and goals (Matsumoto et al., 2008), as well
as regret (Komiya, Watabe, Miyamoto & Kusumi, 2013)
which may have implications for how respondents from dif-
ferent cultures respond to the RES.
Furthermore, we reiterate that the RES distinguishes be-
tween the affective and cognitive elements of regret, not
functional and maladaptive consequences per se. While the
majority of the consequences of the affective and cognitive
elements appear to follow the pattern of beneficial and mal-
adaptive outcomes, respectively, in some cases the oppo-
site pattern may occur. Counterfactual thoughts may lead
to ineffective learning strategies under certain conditions
(Petrocelli & Harris, 2011), and may be misrepresented in
memory as reality (Taylor, 1991; Garry & Polaschek, 2000;
Petrocelli & Crysel, 2009). In these situations, the cogni-
tive component of regret may lead to poorer performance
on subsequent tasks. Furthermore, negative emotions, such
as sadness, can facilitate cognitive processing, leading to
greater attention to detail and less heuristic or stereotypic
processing (Gasper & Clore, 2000; Bodenhausen, Sheppard
&Kramer, 1994). The affective element of regret could have
similar effects. It is thus inappropriate to conflate affective
with maladaptive and cognitive with beneficial outcomes.
5.3 Conclusions
Regret, an emotion of “what could have been”, permeates
people’s lives: when making decisions, we anticipate regret
and try to avoid it; when receiving negative outcomes, we
often experience regret; and when looking back at our lives,
we take stock of our biggest regrets. The RES offers re-
searchers the possibility to reliably measure two essential
components of regret – affect and cognition— thus allowing
a new opportunity for insight into the complex and at times
conflicting role of regret in decision-making and well-being.
Given the pervasive nature of regret and its ability to be a
powerful force for both good and ill, we hope that this scale
facilitates both better measurement as well as greater the-
oretical understanding of this important and complex emo-
tion.
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Appendix
Regret elicitation instructions: "We would like you to think
of a past situation or event where you felt regret. Think
about a time when you felt your situation would have been
better, if only you had behaved differently. Think about a
time when a decision you made negatively affected an out-
come, and you wished the decision and/or outcome was dif-
ferent.
Picture this situation in your mind. Try and remember as
vividly as you can what this past situation was like. Think of
what happened to make you feel regret, and what regret felt
like in this particular situation. When you have this memory
clearly in mind, answer the following questions:
1. Tell us in detail what happened to cause you to feel this
emotion.
2. Tell us in as much detail as you can what you were
feeling and thinking.
3. Tell us about what you did and what you said.
As much as possible, write your description so that some-
one reading it would feel the regret you felt from reading
your description."
